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 T
he proposed settlement in the Google Book Search 
case should be approved with strings attached. 1 The 
project will be immensely good for society, and the 
proposed deal is a fair one for Google, for authors, 
and for publishers. The public interest demands, how-
ever, that the settlement be modified first. It creates two 
new entities—the Books Rights Registry Leviathan and 
the Google Book Search Behemoth—with dangerously 
concentrated power over the publishing industry. Left 
unchecked, they could trample on consumers in any 
number of ways. We the public have a right to demand 
that those entities be subject to healthy, pro-competitive 
oversight, and so we should. 
 After laying out the basics of the proposed settle-
ment agreement and explaining how it will benefit 
both the parties to the lawsuit and society more broadly, 
I’ll work through the implications of five overriding 
 principles: 
 1. The Registry poses an antitrust threat. The Book 
Rights Registry will be a new collecting society 
representing the interests of authors and publish-
ers. This kind of collective action poses an obvious 
antitrust risk: What if the Registry becomes the 
instrument of a cartel to fix the price of books? 
To keep the Registry from overreaching, we’ll 
need more checks than the settlement currently 
 contains. 
 2. Google poses an antitrust threat. By virtue of the 
settlement, Google will have the book search market 
and the download market for orphan works largely 
to itself. The structure of a class action settlement, 
in itself, is a highly effective barrier to entry. We’ll 
need similar checks on Google’s actions to keep it 
from acting anticompetitively in book markets. 
 3. Consumers need protection. The settlement as it 
stands is often good at ensuring minimum standards 
to benefit libraries, institutions, and consumers. 
But in some areas, such as price discrimination and 
privacy , the settlement leaves the door open for 
Google to behave oppressively. We’ll need to close 
that door. 
 4.  Public goods should be widely available. Just by 
providing the search and download services and 
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by processing payments, Google and the Registry 
will assemble some immensely useful databases about 
book copyright information. These databases are clas-
sic public goods, and neither Google nor the Registry 
will need exclusive rights over them as an incentive. 
We’ll need to make sure that those databases are 
made available to the public. 
 5. Transparency and accountability matter. If Google 
becomes a chokepoint for getting books to the public, 
there’s a risk that it could  secretly censor. Google, of 
course, doesn’t want to distribute books that  it strong-
ly disagrees with (or fears legal liability from). These 
two goals can be reconciled. We’ll need to make sure 
that when Google chooses not to make books avail-
able, it leaves open suitable alternative channels for 
getting them to the public. 
 These five principles give rise to a number of specific 
recommendations. Each proposed change is incremental 
and fully consistent with the settlement’s overall goals 
and design. 
 THE SETTLEMENT 
 First, a little history. Google Book Search is actually 
two related programs. The Partner Program works with 
books that it receives from publishers (either physically 
or as PDFs). Meanwhile, the Library Project has been 
scanning books en masse from the collections of uni-
versity and civic libraries. Either way, Google folds the 
scans into its gigantic Book Search index. Enter a search 
term, and Google will show you a list of books contain-
ing the term. 
 What happens when you click on a result depends 
on where the book came from. For public-domain books 
from the Library Project, you go directly to a page where 
you can browse the book online or download a PDF copy. 
For books from the Partner Program, Google lets the pub-
lisher decide how much users can see. Generous publishers 
enable extensive previewing of sample chapters; stingy 
publishers allow you to see only a snippet of a few lines 
containing the search term; paranoid publishers prohibit 
even that. 
 This leaves open a large middle ground: in-copyright 
books from the Library Project. Most of these books are 
out of print; many of them are “orphan works” for which 
no copyright owner can be found. Google’s policy has 
been to make these books searchable and available in 
snippets. That may not seem like much, but it’s still more 
than many authors and publishers would like; they see 
Google as a trespasser willing to drive through the yards 
of people who aren’t at home. 
 The proposed settlement is complex, but its central 
deal is simple. Looking backward, Google will be released 
from liability for its scanning, searching, and displaying 2 
in exchange for a set of one-time payments totaling about 
$125 million. 3 Looking forward, it will be allowed to 
continue scanning and displaying books 4 in exchange for 
63 percent of its net revenues from the advertising that it 
shows on search results and book display pages. 5 This deal 
is most significant for out-of-print and orphan works: It 
effectively lets Google go ahead with making substantial 
uses of these works, while holding a share of the revenues 
in trust for the copyright owners. 
 Of course, many of the copyright owners who’ll be 
paid as part of the settlement don’t currently have deals 
with Google. A new Book Rights Registry will be in 
charge of mediating all these relationships. 6 It will take 
payments from Google and pass them along to the appro-
priate authors and publishers. In the other direction, it 
will communicate to Google copyright owners’ requests 
for the levels of access allowed to their books. 
 The settlement also authorizes some exciting new 
programs. An Institutional Subscription system will 
allow Google to sell all-you-can-eat digital access to 
the entire catalog of scanned books to companies, 
colleges, and potentially even individuals. 7 A Public 
Access Service will provide a restricted version of the 
Institutional Subscription to colleges and public librar-
ies for free. 8 Meanwhile, a Consumer Purchase system 
will allow Google to sell electronic access to complete 
individual books. 9 Copyright owners can set their sale 
price or delegate that decision to Google’s algorithmic 
whizzes. 10 The revenues from these new programs, along 
with other new revenue models worked out by Google 
and the Registry, will also flow to copyright owners in 
the same 63/37 split. 11 A section on “Non-Consumptive 
Research” also allows researchers to run gigantic auto-
mated statistical studies on the entire corpus of scanned 
books. 12 Copyright owners won’t be paid for these uses 
on the theory that they don’t involve people “read-
ing portions of a Book to understand [its] intellectual 
 content.” 13 
 Meanwhile, the libraries that have been supplying 
books for scanning aren’t actually parties to the lawsuit. 
The settlement, however, contains provisions that enable 
them to sign agreements with the Registry that effectively 
release them from liability. 14 Libraries that get back digi-
tal copies of their books from Google must agree to keep 
those copies secure and limit access; 15 libraries that don’t 
have few other obligations. 16 
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 THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD 
BE APPROVED 
 My starting point is that the settlement is a good 
thing. Everyone is better off than they would be in a world 
without Google Book Search: 
 • Google makes piles of money from selling ads, sub-
scriptions, and e-books. 
 • Authors and publishers get the lion’s share of that 
money. 
 • The publishing industry benefits from the incidental 
cleanup of copyright records. 
 • Universities, schools, companies, and other institu-
tions can subscribe to Google’s convenient fire hose 
of books. 
 • Public and college libraries get free access to the fire 
hose. 
 • The libraries participating in scanning books get digi-
tal copies of the scanned books from their collections. 
 • Individual readers get an increasingly comprehensive 
book search engine. 
 • Readers also get free PDF access to millions upon 
millions of public-domain books and two paid-but-
convenient digital sources for in-copyright books. 
 • The public as a whole gets a substantial leg up on 
solving the orphan-works problem. 
 • Researchers running automated studies can advance 
human knowledge on algorithms, natural language, 
the history of publishing, and other topics. 
 These are serious benefits, and the settlement is a 
universal win compared with the  status quo . Still, some 
commentators dislike the settlement because they that 
think we’d be even better off if the case proceeded to trial 
and judgment. They’d been hoping that Google would 
have established that its scanning and searching features 
were fair uses. If Google had prevailed on the fair use issue, 
it would have opened the book search business to anyone, 
free from legal taint. What’s more, it would have given us 
a powerful, portable fair use principle that could do a lot of 
other good in this digital age. While a definitive finding of 
fair use would have been better than the settlement, that’s 
not the choice on the table. There are three good reasons 
that we should settle for the settlement. 
 First, there’s no guarantee that Google would have 
won on the fair use issue. A finding against fair use, 
especially given the possibility that the Supreme Court 
would have granted  certiorari in such a socially signifi-
cant case, could have done immense damage to other 
large-scale projects making beneficial but incidental uses 
of a great many copyrighted works. The settlement is so 
comprehensive, however, that it gives us perhaps 80 or 90 
percent of the actual uses of books that a positive fair use 
finding would have enabled. Those who favor a judicial 
showdown on the fair use issue would do better to join 
that battle in some other case, one in which the equities 
tip more clearly in favor of fair use. 
 Second, even if scholars and observers would like 
a fair use fight, it’s not our call to make. It’s Google’s. 
Google was the defendant; it earned that dubious privilege 
by actually scanning and searching books. Having stepped 
up to the plate to risk a lawsuit, and having been beaned 
with one, Google now has the right to choose whether to 
settle that suit. Google’s choice to settle takes away no 
legal rights from anyone else; one else loses the fair use 
argument because Google didn’t chance it. 
 I’ve seen people raise the argument that Google’s 
capitulation means that there’s now a functioning licens-
ing market for searching books. If true, this fact would 
undercut fair use claims by Google’s competitors, since 
it would imply that scanning and searching without pay-
ment take away revenue that copyright holders could have 
realized. The critical hole in this argument is that this isn’t 
a market that one can effectively negotiate in without the 
device of the class-action lawsuit. Even after the settle-
ment, there will still be far too many potential plaintiffs 
for any competitor to be able to cleanly license all the 
rights that it needs to start large-scale scanning. It’s also 
significant that Google won’t pay royalties for scanning or 
searching under the settlement; the paid uses only start 
once a user clicks through from a search results page to a 
page with content from a specific book. 17 If the settlement 
creates a distinct market for scanning and searching, it’s 
a market in which these uses are worthless to copyright 
owners. 
 Third, given that Google and the copyright owners 
are the parties here, there’s no way to force the court to 
consider the fair use issue. The adversarial legal process 
allows parties to present their cases and controversies to a 
judge for resolution. It doesn’t generally allow outsiders to 
compel the parties to litigate issues not of their choosing. 
This fact means that, to the extent that the rest of us want 
the court to modify the settlement or even to think about 
particular issues, we need to find a hook to put them prop-
erly before the court. There are some such hooks, but the 
fair use question isn’t one of them. There is no convincing 
way to categorize that specific copyright issue as part of the 
general public interest that the court is directed to take 
into account in approving a settlement. 
 Thus, I start from a baseline of believing that the 
settlement should be approved. It makes all of us better 
off, and it is, in an intuitive and meaningful sense, quite 
fair to all involved. I have concerns and critiques, but I see 
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them as patches to make the settlement better, not as do-
or-die clauses that the settlement must absolutely contain. 
My suggestions flow from the principles identified earlier. 
 PRINCIPLE 1: THE REGISTRY POSES 
AN ANTITRUST THREAT 
 The basic deal embodied in the settlement—authors 
and publishers who don’t opt out will receive payments out 
of Google’s revenues—will create a huge administrative 
workload. Someone needs to maintain a database of who 
owns which copyrights, mediate in ownership disputes, 
process payments, audit Google, and so on. Although 
collecting societies currently do many of these jobs for 
other kinds of works, such as ASCAP for musical works 
and SoundExchange for sound recordings, the United 
States doesn’t currently have a suitable similar organiza-
tion for books. Nor can these tasks be trusted to Google, 
which would have an obvious conflict of interest if it were 
charged with tracking down AWOL authors or being its 
own auditor. Thus, the settlement agreement establishes a 
new collecting society, the Book Rights Registry. 18 
 The Registry doesn’t just have ministerial tasks, 
though. It also has substantial authority to negotiate on 
behalf of authors and publishers. It has approval power 
over the security standards that Google and the various 
libraries must create and live by. 19 It has broad discretion 
to work out an equitable formula for dividing revenues 
among publishers and authors. 20 It can even negotiate the 
terms of new revenue models ( e.g ., print-on-demand, PDF 
downloads, and coursepacks). 21 
 If your antitrust sensors aren’t pinging wildly at this 
point, please make sure that they’re properly calibrated. 
The Registry is a centralized entity with the authority to 
negotiate on behalf of all registered book copyright own-
ers. As such, it walks and quacks like a cartel. There’s a 
reason that ASCAP and BMI, which play similar roles for 
musical compositions, live under antitrust consent decrees; 
otherwise, they could make or break radio stations and 
musicians and drive up the effective price of music. Were 
all authors and publishers ( i.e ., the plaintiff class, more 
or less) to sign a piece of paper giving the Registry these 
powers, it could barely lift a finger without violating the 
Sherman Act. That fact doesn’t change just because the 
agreement is the result of a class action settlement rather 
than a meeting in the world’s largest smoke-filled room. 
 The settlement recognizes this danger, and accord-
ingly puts some very important limits on the Registry. It’s 
specifically prohibited from representing any subgroup 
of copyright owners; it has to act in all their interest. 22 
(This restriction keeps it from being used by one group 
of authors, say, to suppress the market for another group’s 
books.) Similarly, its board is equally divided between 
authors and publishers, with any action requiring a 
majority. 23 
 Further, the settlement ensures that the licenses that 
copyright owners grant to participate are non-exclusive; 
they can strike side deals with anyone they like. 24 They’re 
guaranteed more than two years to decide whether to 
remove their books from the program entirely. 25 Even after 
that, they can opt out of almost everything beyond basic 
searchability, in which Google will tell users what page of 
a book contains a search term, but won’t show them any 
of the actual text around the term’s appearance on that 
page. 26 Even within the Consumer Purchase system, indi-
vidual copyright owners are always free to set the price for 
e-books sold through Google. 
 These facts keep the Registry from acting like a classic 
price-fixing cartel; individual publishers can easily defect 
and charge less (or more). It’s true that the Registry could 
facilitate coordination, but that’s not a big issue in the 
publishing industry. Publishers can already see what each 
others’ suggested prices are by looking on Amazon. 
 The Registry, however, will be an anticompetitive 
threat for the same reason that this lawsuit will transform 
publishing: the settlement’s class-binding effect. If Google 
would like to negotiate, say, an encryption standard and 
DRM terms for book downloads, without the Registry, it 
needs to negotiate one-on-one with authors and publish-
ers. But the Registry is authorized to negotiate on their 
behalf, all of their behalf. It could agree with Google on a 
privacy-intrusive DRM standard that fed back usage infor-
mation into a database used to do industry-wide price-
 fixing in the guise of price discrimination. Other examples 
abound; the Registry’s centralized negotiating role permits 
various anti-competitive practices to be coordinated and 
laundered. What should we do about these risks? 
 •  Antitrust consent decree. The Registry should be 
under ongoing antitrust supervision from the day of 
its birth. The Department of Justice (DoJ) should 
require that it negotiate and sign an antitrust con-
sent decree. That decree would enumerate various 
forbidden anticompetitive practices, including those 
called out in the settlement, ones pertaining to hid-
den price-fixing, and whatever else the experts in the 
Antitrust Division think necessary to add. In addi-
tion, the DoJ should be given the authority to review 
all contracts entered into by the Registry and reject 
any with anticompetitive effect. 
•  Nondiscrimination among copyright owners. For 
understandable but regrettable jurisdictional rea-
sons, the plaintiff class doesn’t include owners of 
unregistered copyrights, nor does it include future 
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authors. Only currently registered copyright owners 
are part of the lawsuit, which means that only they 
can be part of the settlement. 27 The most immediate 
danger is that the Registry might adopt policies that 
operate to the benefit of past authors and against 
future authors (policies with narrow views of fair use 
and broad views of a derivative works right come to 
mind). There’s an easy way out, which is that the 
Registry must be explicitly required to represent any 
copyright owners who agree to its standard deal and 
explicitly forbidden from offering non-plaintiff and 
future copyright owners any materially different deal. 
This pair of rules guarantees to anyone who comes 
along in the future effectively the same opt-out right 
that the settlement class enjoys, while offering them 
exactly the same terms if they choose not to opt out. 
This way, the Registry will truly be a fair, impartial 
representative of all authors and publishers. 
 •  Library and reader representation at the registry. 
Beyond that, the Registry’s structural protections 
should be supplemented to include voices from 
outside the publishing industry. It’s acceptable and 
understandable for the Registry’s charter to require 
that at least one author representative and at least 
one publisher representative consent to any action 
that it takes, but that veto principle doesn’t require 
that they be the only members of its board. It should 
also contain members representing libraries and the 
reading public. In addition to objecting if the Registry 
takes anti-competitive, anti-reader actions, these 
additional members would be able to monitor the 
Registry’s actions, bringing important transparency to 
this new quarter-ton gorilla of the book industry. 
 PRINCIPLE 2: GOOGLE POSES 
AN ANTITRUST THREAT 
 The Registry isn’t the only entity that’ll have market 
power as a result of the settlement. Google will too. It’ll 
become the only game in town for scanning and searching 
books on anything resembling this scale. Yes, it was the 
only game in town on this scale before, but that was when 
there was a legal threat hanging over it. Now Google will 
have the legal okay to go full-steam ahead, with some 
exceedingly tasty markets all to itself. 
 The immediate rejoinder from Google, of course, is 
that these markets aren’t closed to entry. Microsoft used 
to have a book-scanning program; it could have one 
again. There’s nothing in the settlement to prevent any-
one involved from doing side deals with others. Authors 
could license Yahoo! to scan, index, and sell. The Registry 
could split the take. Libraries could subscribe to Yahoo!’s 
version of the fire hose. The settlement just sets up a series 
of deals with Google; it leaves everything else open for all 
comers. 
 The problem with this argument is that you can’t 
actually just go out and do what Google has done. One of 
Google’s fair use arguments would have been the insane 
transaction costs of trying to negotiate with every pos-
sible copyright claimant, particularly for out-of-print and 
orphaned books. The settlement gives Google a clean 
release from the transaction-cost madness. All those pesky 
claims from authors who can’t be found or won’t play ball 
just go away. 
 Consider the unappetizing options facing a would-be 
competitor like Yahoo! If it goes ahead and starts doing 
large-scale scanning, it’ll get sued just the way Google did, 
but there’s no guarantee that the plaintiffs there would 
feel any interest in settling on terms comparable to the 
ones that Google got. Indeed, as long as there were poten-
tial plaintiffs out there, Yahoo! couldn’t feel safe, even if 
it had struck agreements with 99 percent of them. The 
others could still pull enough of copyright’s harsh remedial 
levers to scotch the whole enterprise. 
 No, Yahoo! would need the same magic device of 
the class action that Google is now taking advantage of. 
Would the plaintiffs bother to organize themselves as a 
class for its benefit? There’s no guarantee they would. 
Yahoo! would be in the especially tricky situation of filing 
a declaratory judgment action against a class of copyright 
owner defendants. It’d be hard even just to pick proper 
class representatives and appoint appropriate class counsel 
without some kind of collusion. And once there were class 
representatives, would they settle on comparable terms? 
There’s no guarantee of it, especially given the guaranteed 
good deal that they’re getting from Google. 
 I’ve also heard floated the idea that competitors are 
perfectly free to lobby Congress on orphan works legisla-
tion. So they are, but the argument that lobbying is an 
acceptable substitute for free competition in the book 
market as it currently exists is laughable. If I manufacture 
widgets and my competitor is monopolizing the widget 
market, it’s no answer to my pleas to say that I can ask 
Congress for widget subsidies. Orphan works legislation, 
done right, would be a great thing. But no one should 
have to count on it happening as a condition of entry to a 
market that Google is already in. 
 Thus, Google’s first-past-the-post status here could 
easily turn into a durable monopoly. That might be the 
inevitable result anyway; this is a market with substantial 
economies of scale and positive network effects. One may 
or may not think that a book-search and distribution 
monopoly built on such structural bases is legitimate; one 
may or may not favor government intervention if it just so 
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happens that Google is the only player in this game. I take 
no position on these questions. But the court reviewing 
this settlement should not set up its own power—in the 
form of its ability to bind absent class members—as a bar-
rier to entry in the online-books and book-search markets. 
What, then, should the court do? 
 •  No most-favored-nation clause. The most pressing 
problem is that the settlement explicitly guarantees 
Google a privileged position, via a most-favored-
nation clause in Google’s favor. For 10 years, the 
Registry can’t give anyone else better “economic and 
other terms” than Google gets. 28 Notice, for example, 
that this term would preclude the Registry from offer-
ing a better revenue-sharing deal to Yahoo! even if 
the Registry thinks that this better deal is necessary 
to turn Yahoo! into a serious competitor to Google. 
This clause alone might be enough to deter any other 
serious entry. Google’s concern about being undercut 
is real, but provided that the Registry itself is under 
proper antitrust scrutiny (see above), it has nothing 
legitimate to fear. The most-favored-nations clause 
should be struck. 
 •  Competitors offered the same deal as Google.  Any 
other entity willing to assume the same payment and 
security obligations that Google assumes in the settle-
ment should be allowed to offer the same services 
that Google will, or any subset of them. This kind of 
competition is fair to authors and publishers because 
the various payment and security terms are already 
presumably acceptable to them. It’s fair to Google, 
which gets the same deal it currently does. It’s fair 
to competitors, who could enter on a level playing 
ground, without needing to roll the dice on invoking 
the legal system’s power to intervene. And it saves 
the legal system the work of having to deal with the 
Microsoft Book Search lawsuit, the Yahoo! Book 
Search lawsuit, the Facebook Book Search lawsuit, 
and so on. 
 •  Registry authority to negotiate with Google 
 competitors. The previous rule suffices for the  services 
the settlement describes, but there are also the new 
business models, which can’t be specified in detail 
precisely because they don’t exist yet. Under the pro-
posed settlement, the Registry can give its blessing to 
Google on plenty of projects; it should be allowed to 
give the same blessing to anyone else. Crucially, that 
blessing would have the same effect of binding all 
authors and publishers to the deal it strikes. Again, 
authorizing the Registry to do such things is fair 
because copyright owners could still opt out of any 
new uses. 29 Once the Registry did bless a project—by 
Google or by a competitor—the previous rule would 
kick in and require that the new project license be 
available to anyone on nondiscriminatory terms.  
 •  Beware a scanning monopoly. If Google remains the 
dominant player in actually scanning books, we ought 
to be concerned about steps that it takes to preserve 
or extend that monopoly. 30 This concern is especially 
acute for public-domain books, which ought not to 
be under anyone’s exclusive control. Google’s Web 
search engine has the right model: It returns results 
from Google-run sites alongside results from sites run 
by others. Google’s book search engine should be 
similarly ecumenical and treat book scans put online 
by others on an evenhanded basis. Google should also 
be prohibited from using its terms of service to put 
copyright-like terms-of-service restrictions on what 
others do with its public-domain scans. 31 In the oppo-
site direction, Google’s collection of public-domain 
books should be open to other search engines. 
 PRINCIPLE 3: CONSUMERS 
NEED PROTECTION 
 Despite being the product of a lawsuit in which the 
reading public isn’t directly represented, the proposed 
settlement often takes the public interest seriously. Many 
clauses in it aren’t strictly necessary to resolve the dispute 
between the parties to the lawsuit but nonetheless go a 
good way toward making sure that the results will provide 
books to the public on fair terms: 
 • Google specifically promises that it won’t use pop-up 
or pop-under ads, and the Registry is also authorized 
to take swift action to opt authors out of having 
their books shown with “animated, audio or video 
 advertisements.”  32 
 • In providing the Institutional Subscription, Google 
guarantees that its terms and conditions will “not 
prohibit any uses . . . that would otherwise be permit-
ted under the Copyright Act.” 33 This is significant; 
it’s a commitment that the subscriptions won’t require 
readers to surrender their fair use rights, for example. 
 • Similarly, the Institutional Subscription will never 
offer an “experience and rights” worse than those 
enjoyed by readers who purchase e-books through the 
program, 34 and copyright owners won’t be allowed to 
sell out-of-print books while excluding them from the 
Institutional Subscription. 35 
 • Colleges and public libraries will receive free comput-
er terminals with complete access to the Institutional 
Subscription. 36 The service is stingy by default: Four-
year colleges will receive one terminal per 10,000 
16
J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N E T  L A W  A p r i l  2 0 0 9
students, and public libraries one per building. Google 
isn’t even obligated to provide the service at all. 
(There’s authority for Google and the Registry to 
expand this program, but it’s unclear that the Registry 
would ever approve more generous terms.) 
 • Various provisions of the Copyright Act operate in 
favor of libraries and other public-service entities, 
and the settlement makes sure that those promises 
remain intact. Libraries that allowed their books to 
be scanned get back digital copies, which they can 
use for accessibility purposes and to replace damaged 
or lost copies of physical books. 37 
 These provisions are all to the good. There are, how-
ever, other consumer-protection matters on which the 
settlement is silent or ambiguous. Google insists on its 
good intentions in many of these areas. (”Don’t be evil,” 
and all that.) I would prefer to see stronger protections 
than Google’s continued promises of non-evilness. It’s in 
the nature of such assurances that they’re still offered long 
after they’ve ceased to be true. To the extent that Google 
really means to abide by them, it should have no objection 
to putting these terms explicitly in the settlement agree-
ment or in an FTC consent decree. 
 •  No price discrimination. The pricing structure for the 
Institutional Subscription will be largely fair. (Google 
will set pricing on an FTE basis with different pric-
ing buckets for different categories of institutions, for 
example, higher education, corporate, government, 
etc. 38 ) For individual buyers, either booksellers can 
pick a price, or they can let Google’s algorithms set a 
price for them based on buying patterns. 39 The settle-
ment doesn’t explicitly say that Google won’t charge 
different readers different prices for the same book, 
something that its immense computational power 
and huge pricing corpus might make dangerously 
attractive. Google has no current plans to do so, and 
it’s true that the market punished Amazon harshly 
when it tried the same stunt a few years back, but still. 
Better safe than sorry. 
 •  Reader privacy.  Your choice of reading matter ought 
to be highly private. There’s a real concern that 
Google could identify and track readers, page by page, 
minute by minute. Indeed, the security standard that 
Google must comply with requires it to keep exten-
sive logs of user activity. 40 Similarly, libraries that 
open their digital copies for scholarly and classroom 
uses must “keep track of and report[] all such uses 
of Books to the Registry.” 41 The only explicit pri-
vacy protections in the settlement, though, are about 
keeping private the information that the Registry has 
about copyright owners. 42 That’s insufficient. The 
settlement should contain explicit privacy guaran-
tees that user information and reading habits should 
be monitored only to the minimal extent necessary 
for billing, auditing, and security; that no such data 
be used for any other purpose, that all such data be 
promptly destroyed when no longer needed; that 
Google not reveal any information about any user 
or users’ reading habits to any other entity, including 
the Registry; and that Google be legally responsible 
for any security breaches resulting in third-party 
access to reader information. 
 •  Reasonable terms and conditions. The settlement 
should protect reader rights under the Copyright 
Act across the board. There’s a good first cut at such 
language in the settlement already. Google promises 
reasonable terms and conditions for the Institutional 
Subscription, specifically that it will “not prohibit 
any uses . . . that would otherwise be permitted under 
the Copyright Act.” 43 Similarly, the Library-Registry 
agreements should contain explicit statements that 
library terms of service will not require readers to give 
up any of their other rights under the Copyright Act. 
Any new business models should come with the same 
protections, as well. 
 PRINCIPLE 4: PUBLIC GOODS 
SHOULD BE WIDELY AVAILABLE 
 The Google Book Search project would be  impossible 
without some crucial bibliographic databases. A pile of 
scans is useless unless it’s linked to a database of publi-
cation metadata. Since only out-of-print books will be 
previewable by default, Google needs a database telling 
it which books are in and out of print. 44 To convey copy-
right-owner requests to Google and to convey payments 
from Google to them, the Registry will need a database of 
book copyright ownership. Some of these databases exist 
already; some will be built or supplemented as part of the 
project. 
 These databases are all public goods. They’ll be use-
ful to readers and researchers. They’re also going to be 
immensely useful to players in the book business. The 
in-print database will help libraries understand their rights 
under copyright law; the rights-owner database will help 
publishers gather the rights that they need to publish new 
and exciting editions. 
 Moreover, these databases are byproducts of the 
Google Book Search project, not its goals. Google isn’t 
compiling them because it can make money selling access 
to the databases. Instead, it’s compiling them because it 
can’t offer Book Search without them. Whether or not 
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Google (or the Registry) can monetize these databases 
directly won’t substantially affect the incentive to compile 
them. 
 Taken together, these propositions imply that these 
databases should be opened to broad public access. That’s 
exactly the policy that the settlement takes with the 
Books Database—Google’s list of books it has or plans to 
scan—which is required to be online and searchable. 45 The 
same policy should be adopted wherever else  possible. 
 That’s not everywhere. I’m informed that Google has 
assembled its database of bibliographic metadata about 
publication largely by licensing it from other sources. 
Scholars may contest whether such databases should be 
capable of exclusive licensing, but even those who want to 
pick that fight shouldn’t pick it here. Google didn’t gener-
ate this data; it shouldn’t be forced to reveal it. 
 The correct principle, instead, is that to the extent that 
Google and the Registry create new and useful metadata 
databases as part of the Book Search project, those data-
bases should be offered to the public, gratis, and without 
legal or technical restrictions. The settlement agreement 
contemplates at least two such databases, both important 
(though the principle might also apply to others). 
 •  Publicly available in-print information. Consider 
first the database of in-print information that Google 
needs to decide whether works are “commercially 
available” and thus restricted by default. Google cur-
rently synthesizes this information from a variety of 
sources (such as looking at used book sales online). 46 
Google is required by the settlement to make this 
information available to the Registry on behalf of 
copyright owners; 47 it should be required to make 
the database public, as well. This isn’t likely to be a 
practical problem, since Google will all but inevitably 
expose this information when it lets users either see 
preview pages or not. But still, Google shouldn’t be 
given the option to restrict its availability; in case 
Google does wind up having competitors in this 
space, there will be an inevitable temptation to cut 
off access as a way of slowing down the other guy. 
 •  Publicly available copyright ownership  information. 
There’s also the database of information about copy-
right claims that the Registry will need to use to 
distribute payments among copyright owners. The 
Registry is required to share much of this information 
with Google; 48 it should be required to share almost 
as much of the copyright-owner database with the 
public. There are privacy concerns here, since it will 
contain information about authors, but those con-
cerns can be accommodated without much limiting 
the usefulness of the database in solving orphan works 
problems. Pseudonyms and proxies are reasonable, 
provided that the database in general is made avail-
able so that others can use it as a point of contact in 
finding copyright owners or in verifying that no one 
knows who the owner is or where she can be found. 
 •  Best practices for open access. In making these 
databases available and in providing some of the 
other core services (the exact set to be determined), 
Google should be required to use standard APIs and 
open data formats, as well as to allow programmatic 
access and bulk download where appropriate. Google 
currently does this as a matter of policy in many of 
its other lines of business, and it’s already providing 
PDF downloads of public-domain books. These good 
policies should be enshrined as actual requirements. 
Among other things, they’ll ensure that Google’s 
competitors behave reasonably, too. 
 PRINCIPLE 5: ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND TRANSPARENCY MATTER 
 Google has been repeatedly criticized by scholars 
and activists upset at its lack of institutional transpar-
ency. It’s also learned from that criticism. The settlement 
agreement contains some reassuring provisions to provide 
accountability. As good as they are, they should be supple-
mented with a few more. 
 Institutionally, Google and the Registry are given 
mutual rights to audit each others’ relevant books. 49 While 
these audits are themselves confidential, the arrange-
ment creates a healthy system of mutual accountability. 
Similarly, research users and libraries are subject to secu-
rity audits under suitable procedures. 50 When there are 
disputes about public-domain or in-print status, they’re 
subjected to a low-stakes initial process that lets the par-
ties sort out the facts. 51 Larger disputes go first through 
executive-level mediation and then arbitration, on rea-
sonably balanced terms. 52 
 Google has also accepted a fairly stringent set of rules 
that prohibit it from altering the texts of the books that 
it scans. There are the usual, sensible carve outs: Google 
can hyperlink indices, it can link from books to sources 
they cite, it can highlight user search queries, and it can 
even add a limited social-networking annotation-sharing 
feature. 53 These are specific exceptions, however, from the 
general principle that it won’t change one word of the 
author’s writings without permission. 54 Good. 
 Google has even agreed to procedures that limit its 
editorial discretion to exclude books from being displayed. 
If Google removes a book for “editorial reasons,” it will tell 
the Registry about it and give the Registry a digital copy of 
the book. 55 The Registry may then go out and commission 
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a competitor to provide the display services that Google 
has refused to. 56 Google believes it has a First Amendment 
right not to be required to “speak” by passing along a book 
that it strongly objects to, and it’s chosen an honorable 
and speech-friendly way of exercising that right. Google’s 
waiver does not censor the book itself, which can still be 
made available through other means. 
 There are, however, some potential accountability 
holes in this system. One is that the Registry need not, 
or might not be able to, find a replacement for Google. 
I’m reluctant to intervene too strongly here, particularly 
when no other potential partner is willing to step forward. 
Others, bolder than I, might propose a positive duty on 
the Registry’s part, but I take no position on the issue, 
noting only that it raises difficult issues of free speech law 
and free speech policy. Fortunately, other potential holes 
are easier and less controversial to close. 
 •  No secret censorship.  If Google de-lists a book and 
the Registry doesn’t or can’t engage a replacement, 
the book will genuinely vanish from this new Library 
of Alexandria. Perhaps that should happen for some 
books, but decisions like that shouldn’t be made in 
secret. When Google chooses to exclude a book for 
editorial reasons, it should be required to inform the 
copyright owner and the general public, not just the 
Registry. This path leaves intact Google’s option to 
be silent, but requires that it be exercised with trans-
parency. If and when Google chooses not to speak, 
it should own the ethical consequences, rather than 
being able to hide from its decision to hide a book . 
 •  Clear definition of non-editorial exclusion. The 
settlement contains no clear distinction between 
“non-editorial” and “editorial” reasons for Google to 
exclude a book from being displayed. This ambigu-
ity raises the possibility that Google might exclude 
a book for editorial reasons but tell no one, not 
even the Registry, about it, and thereby completely 
suppress the book. There’s a danger of line-crossing 
wherever a line is drawn, but assuming that Google 
will act in good faith, a sharper definition of “non-
editorial reasons” should suffice. The current draft of 
the settlement says “quality, user experience, legal, or 
other non-editorial reasons,” an unclear and impre-
cise list that could easily be converted into a clear and 
precise one. 
 •  Accurate scanning. Under the settlement, Google 
can’t “intentionally alter” the text of the books that 
it scans, 57 but it doesn’t promise anything about the 
quality of the digitization process itself. Unfortunately, 
scanning mistakes have left some of its digital books 
all but unreadable. 58 Google should be required to 
institute a review program that would take reports of 
distorted or mutilated digital versions, respond with 
reasonable speed, and rescan the books if necessary 
(and allowed by the owner of the physical copy). 
 •  Other scanning institutions. One last point of 
accountability concerns an issue raised by Jean-Noël 
Jeanneney: What books are scanned and in the col-
lection at all? 59 Jeanneney’s specific concern—a lack 
of Francophone sources—has an easy and obvious 
response: The Bibliothèque nationale de France, of 
which he is the president, could join with Google to 
scan its collections. Indeed, Google has indicated its 
broad willingness to partner with libraries interested 
in scanning large corpuses of books to get them into 
the digital collection more quickly. Once again, 
Google’s sensible policy is one thing in the context 
of a private Google project and another in the con-
text of a massive remaking of the US system of book 
copyrights that requires the blessing of a court of law. 
So long as Google is the only serious player in book 
scanning and search, any institution that wishes to 
provide books for scanning, or to perform scanning 
itself, should be allowed to take part in the scanning 
effort and ensure that particular works are digitized. 
There will need to be appropriate provisions about 
capacity, financing, quality control, and so on, but 
a well-drafted consent-not-to-be-unreasonably-with-
held clause can take care of many of them. Once 
again, it’s worth emphasizing that this provision, like 
all of the others, would apply both to Google and to 
any of its competitors who come in under the modi-
fied settlement. 
 CONCLUSION 
 The starting point for my analysis has been that 
Google and the copyright owners are asking a federal 
court to put the US judicial power behind a document 
that they have presented to it. The court’s consent should 
not be given lightly; the settlement should be approved 
only when the court is satisfied that it really will serve the 
interests of all parties, including the public. I have tried to 
offer general principles to think through what the public 
interest requires, along with specific, realistic recommen-
dations to implement those principles. 
 At the same time, this is not a sentencing hearing 
or a legislative chamber. The court is not in a position to 
rewire Google and the book industry to right all wrongs 
therein, nor should it try. Google’s other ventures are not 
on the table; nor are the many other problems bedevil-
ing copyright law. My recommendations respond to the 
 specific question that the court faces: Should it use its 
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power to bind absent class members and approve this 
settlement? 
 Thus, I hope that my recommendations all have 
two things in common. Each takes off from some issue 
specifically raised by the proposed settlement, some way 
in which approving the settlement could cause trouble 
down the line. Each then offers a change to head off that 
trouble, a change more or less narrowly tailored to the 
issue it confronts. 
 How do we get there from here? The parties can’t 
settle the case without the court’s approval, but the court 
can’t just rewrite the settlement and impose it on them, 
either. The best alternative would be for Google, the 
authors, and the publishers to modify the proposed settle-
ment along the lines that I’ve suggested and then bring 
the modified version to the court for approval. None of my 
recommendations touches the basic deal at the heart of the 
settlement or seeks to impose terms that the parties should 
find onerous. 
 We don’t need to depend on the parties’ good graces, 
however. Some of the concerns that I’ve discussed can 
easily be raised by members of the plaintiff class as part 
of an objection to the fairness of the settlement to them. 
Authors have a particular interest in not having their 
work unaccountably excluded from Google Book Search, 
for example. They should enter objections to the settle-
ment unless it’s modified. Amicus briefing on some of 
these issues could help the court put the settlement in 
context, as would intervention by some of the many inter-
ested non-parties. 
 Even if the court is unwilling to fit all of these issues 
into the copyright dispute before it, there are other legal 
avenues open. The DoJ could open an investigation into 
the antitrust issues and the Federal Trade Commission 
into the consumer-protection ones. It matters less that 
these recommendations be embodied in the settlement 
than that they be enshrined somewhere enforceable, and 
consent decrees are a perfectly reasonable alternative. 
Potential competitors in book-scanning can also raise 
many of these issues, for example, by way of a private 
antitrust suit; Microsoft, which previously had a book-
scanning project, would be a natural plaintiff. 
 My goals here are pragmatic. I’m not proposing to take 
public control of the Book Search project. In comparison 
with the institutional reconfiguration of book copyright 
law that the settlement would enact, these tweaks are all 
quite minor. Nor am I proposing to leave Book Search 
entirely alone; the parties gave up on that possibility when 
they asked the court to approve this sweeping class-action 
settlement. 
 I hope that these recommendations will prove equally 
appealing to those who think that Google can do no evil 
and those who think that it does only evil. Perhaps they’ll 
prove equally frustrating. I offer them not as criticisms of 
the settlement, but refinements of it. As the chess adage 
goes, “When you see a good move—wait—look for a 
 better one!” 
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